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Introduction
Motivation: Outward FDI from Developing Countries
Outward foreign direct investment (outward FDI) from developing
countries is increasing at a high speed (UNCTAD World Investment
Report (2015)):
I In 2014, MNCs from developing economies invested almost 468 billion
USD abroad, a 23 per cent increase from the previous year.
I Developing and transition economies represent 9 of the 20 largest
investor economies globally.
I Developing economies now account for more than one third of global
FDI outﬂows, up from 13 per cent in 2007.
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Introduction
Chinese Firms' Going Globe
China has seen an astonishing increase in its outward FDI ﬂows in the
past decade.
I China's outward FDI ﬂows: 6.5% of the world's FDI ﬂows in 2012.
I China's outward FDI ﬂows have increased by 37.8 times in the past ten
years, while GDP and trade volume of FDI have only increased by less
than fourfold.
China's outward FDI ﬂows (140 billion USD) surpassed its inward FDI
ﬂows (119 billion USD) in 2014.
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Introduction
Distortion and Misallocation in China
We investigate investment and production strategies of Chinese MNCs
and patterns of China's outward FDI through the lens of domestic
distortions.
Discriminations against private ﬁrms are a fundamental issue for
Chinese economy.
1 Higher ﬁnancing cost: Dollar-Wei (2007); Song, Storesletten &
Zilibotti (2011); Khandelwal, Schott & Wei (2013); Feenstra, Li & Yu
(2014), Manova, Wei & Zhang(2015).
2 Constrained in the exporting market: Bai, Krishna & Ma (2013), Bai,
Hsieh & Song (2015), Khandelwal, Schott & Wei (2013).
3 Higher cost of acquiring land: Tian, Sheng & Zhang (2015).
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Introduction
Stylized Facts
1 Although non-FDI private ﬁrms are more productive than non-FDI
SOEs on average, private FDI ﬁrms are less productive than
state-owned FDI ﬁrms on average (productivity premium for
state-owned MNCs).
I Puzzling, since it is well known that SOE are less productive than
private ﬁrms in China.
2 Compared with private ﬁrms, SOEs are less likely to undertake outward
FDI, and the fraction of outward FDI ﬁrms is smaller among SOEs.
I Puzzling, since SOEs are much bigger and receive supports from
government for going abroad.
(Chen, Tian and Yu) Outward FDI and Distortion 5 / 38
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Introduction
Main Results
1 Theory:
I Consider Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) (i.e., horizontal FDI) with
two (possibly asymmetric) countries.
I Private ﬁrms pay higher input price when producing at home (wedge).
2 Institutional arbitrage:
I Extra beneﬁt for private ﬁrms to invest and produce abroad (alleviation
of distortion).
3 Selection reversal:
I For private ﬁrms (compared with SOEs): tougher selection in the
domestic market and less stringent selection in the FDI market.
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Introduction
Related Literature
1 FDI and MNCs:
I Horizontal: Markusen (1984), Brainard (1997), Helpman, Melitz and
Yeaple (2004);
I Vertical: Helpman (1984), Antràs (2003, 2005) and Antràs and
Helpman (2004).
2 Distortion and Misallocation:
I Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008);
I Midrigan and Xu (2010), Moll (2012);
I Guner, Ventura and Xu (2008) and Garicano, Lelarge and Van Reenen
(2013).
3 Chinese Economy, Distortions and Chinese MNCs:
I Bai, Hsieh and Song (2015), Brandt, Tombe and Zhu (2013),
Khandelwal, Schott and Wei (2013);
I Rosen and Hanemann (2009), Tian and Yu (2014).
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Stylized Facts
Data Source
Annual survey of Chinese manufacturing ﬁrms from 1998 to 2008 (all
SOEs+private ﬁrms with sales higher than 5 million RMB).
Data set of Chinese MNCs' investment transactions (e.g., time of
transaction, destination country, names of parent and aﬃliated
companies, industry code etc.)
Data on MNCs from Zhejiang province for 2006 to 2008. It has
information on investment amount for each FDI transaction.
Orbis data on Chinese MNCs from 2005 to 2008 (merged with ﬁrst
three data sets).
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Stylized Facts
Summary Statistics
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Stylized Facts
Findings: Productivity Premium for State-owned MNCs and
Smaller Fraction of MNCs among SOEs
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Stylized Facts
Robustness: Productivity Premium for State-owned MNCs
only Exists in Capital Intensive Industries
Consistent with distortion against private ﬁrms in credit and capital
markets.
Lower ﬁxed cost of doing outward FDI for SOEs.
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Stylized Facts
Robustness: Distribution of Relative TFP for State-Owned
MNCs FOSD that for Private MNCs
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Stylized Facts
Robustness: Productivity Diﬀerence by Year
(Chen, Tian and Yu) Outward FDI and Distortion 13 / 38
Stylized Facts
Finding: Relative Size Premium for State-owned MNCs
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Theory
Demand
Follow HMY (2004): Horizontal FDI; one industry; two countries;
heterogeneous ﬁrms.
Utility:
U =
[ ∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
, (1)
where q(ω) consumption; σ: elasticity.
Demand function:
q(ω) =
p(ω)−σ
P1−σH
EH , (2)
where PH : ideal price index at home and EH : total income of Home.
Revenue function:
qβE
1
σPβ, (3)
where β ≡ σ−1σ . Aggregate environment:
Di ≡ Pσ−1i Ei i ∈ {H,F}
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Theory
Supply: SOEs
Three production modes: domestic production only;
domestic+exporting; domestic+FDI.
Fixed entry, production, exporting and FDI cost: fe , fd , fX and fI .
Productivity draw: ϕ.
Total variable cost features CRS. For SOEs:
I non-FDI:
(qH + I{qE>0}τqE )wH
ϕ
, (4)
where wH : wage at home. I{qE > 0} is an indication function for
exporting. qH and qF : domestic sales and exports.
I FDI:
qHwH
ϕ
+
qFwF
ϕ
, (5)
where wF wage in foreign country. qF :output produced by the foreign
aﬃliate.
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Theory
Supply: Private Firms
For private ﬁrms:
I non-FDI:
c(qH + I{qE>0}τqE )wH
ϕ
, (6)
I FDI:
cqHwH
ϕ
+
qFwF
ϕ
. (7)
Distortion in input markers: ∃ wedge c > 1 for private ﬁrms when
they produce at home. Thus, it applies to both exporting and
domestic sales.
This wedge does not exist in foreign country. Thus, foreign aﬃliates of
private FDI ﬁrm do not face this distortion.
Evidence: ﬁnancing cost, cost of acquiring land. No evidence on wage.
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Theory
Cutoﬀs: Selection Reversal
Assume fI >> fX >> fD → FDI cutoﬀ > exporting cutoﬀ > exit
cutoﬀ among private ﬁrms and SOEs (sorting pattern).
Surviving and exporting cutoﬀs (tougher selection for private ﬁrms):
ϕ¯PD(= c ϕ¯SD)>ϕ¯SD
and
ϕ¯PX (= c ϕ¯SX )>ϕ¯SX .
FDI cutoﬀs (tougher selection for SOEs):
ϕ¯PO<ϕ¯SO .
Absent choice of exporting, FDI cutoﬀ would be the same for SOEs
and private ﬁrms.
Firm at FDI cutoﬀ compares exporting with FDI → selection reversal.
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Theory
Cutoﬀs: Graphical Representation
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Theory
Testable Predictions: Likelihood of Going abroad and
Average Productivity of MNCs
Proposition 1
(1). Conditioning on the initial draw, private ﬁrms are more likely to
become MNCs. Next, Assume that the initial productivity draw follows the
same Pareto distribution for SOEs and private ﬁrms. (2). Fraction of
MNCs is higher among private ﬁrms than among SOEs. (3). Average
productivity of private MNCs is smaller than that of state-owned MNCs.
Selection reversal → productivity premium and tougher selection for
state-owned MNCs.
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Theory
Testable Predictions: Relative Size Premium
Proposition 3
Suppose the initial productivity draw follows the same Pareto distribution
for SOEs and private ﬁrms. (1). Relative domestic size of private MNCs
(i.e., compared with private non-exporting ﬁrms) is smaller than that of
state-owned MNCs as well.
Tougher selection for state-owned MNCs. → relative size premium for
state-owned MNCs.
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Theory
Testable Predictions: Allocation of Output
Allocation of output:
Proposition 4
Ratio of foreign sales to domestic sales is higher for private MNCs than for
state-owned MNCs. Suppose there is a reduction in ﬁxed cost of FDI.
Conditional on initial productivity draw and other ﬁrm-level characteristics,
increase in overall ﬁrm size is larger for new private MNC than for
state-owned MNC.
Extra beneﬁt for private ﬁrms to invest abroad → increase in overall
ﬁrm size is bigger for them.
Private MNCs produce and sell disproportionately more in foreign
markets owing to non-existence of distortion in that market.
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markets owing to non-existence of distortion in that market.
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Evidence
Evidence for Part One of Proposition One
Conditional on other ﬁrm-level characteristics, SOEs are less like to do
outward FDI.
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Evidence
Existence of Discrimination Against Private Firms
Private ﬁrms pay higher ﬁnancing cost and land acquisition cost than
SOEs.
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Evidence
Evidence for Proposition Four
Ratio of foreign sales to domestic sales is higher for private MNCs
than for state-owned MNCs.
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Evidence
Evidence for Proposition Four
Change in ﬁrm size is bigger for private MNC..
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Evidence
Discussion of Modeling Choices
Version of subsidy to MNCs yields same qualitative result.
I In this case, private ﬁrms have relatively higher incentive of doing FDI.
Diﬀerence in ﬁxed costs?
I Model can explain extensive margin, but cannot explain intensive
margin (i.e., Prop. 4).
Discrimination in product market?
I Model would predict selection reversal for both exporting SOEs and
multinational SOEs (not true in data).
Role of capital?
I Could just replace labor by capital, if we don't assume any adjustment
cost.
I When both factors (as in Bernard Redding and Schott's RES paper)
are present, distortion in capital market also aﬀect ﬁrm's labor choice
(i.e., complements).
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Quantiﬁcation
Calibration
How distortions aﬀect the share of MNCs, aggregate productivity and
welfare after investment liberalization (i.e., fI goes down).
Consider two symmetric countries and a reduction in fI in both
countries.
Take no stance on how taxes are levied and how it aﬀects welfare.
We do calibration by considering two symmetric countries.
I Unknown parameters (wage normalized to one):
(fd , fX , fI , fe , τ, c , k, σ).
I We put higher weight on the moment related to the share of MNCs.
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Quantiﬁcation
Moments
Moments from the Data:
Data Parameter
Pareto Shape Parameter −1.091 k
Ratio of average productivity 1.2 c
Export Intensity 26.28% τ
Share of exporters 16.11% fX
Average employment 265 fd
Share of MNCs 0.325% fI
We exclude ﬁrms whose export intensity is higher than 70%
(processing trade).
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Quantiﬁcation
Parameter Values
Calibrated parameters:
Value Sources
σ 4 Bernard et al. (2003)
ϕmin,SOE 1 normalization
ϕmin,private 1 normalization
fe 1 normalization
k 3.273 Calculated
c 1.2 Calculated
τ 1.41 Calculated
fX 8.975 Calibrated
fd 4.809 Calibrated
fI 1215.26 Calibrated
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Quantiﬁcation
Counterfactual Analysis
We consider a scenario in which fI goes down by a half while other
parameters are kept unchanged.
Increase in the share of MNCs is larger when the distortions are more
severe in the domestic market.
Quantitative magnitude is high.
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Quantiﬁcation
Share of MNCs
(Chen, Tian and Yu) Outward FDI and Distortion 32 / 38
Quantiﬁcation
Counterfactual Analysis (Cont.)
Increase in aggregate productivity is larger when distortions are more
severe, since more private ﬁrms circumvent domestic distortions by
going abroad after reduction in fI .
I Reduction in mass of active ﬁrms.
I Gains in aggregate productivity (i.e., reduction in ideal price index).
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Quantiﬁcation
Aggregate Productivity
(Chen, Tian and Yu) Outward FDI and Distortion 34 / 38
Conclusion
Concluding Remarks
Document three fascinating facts:
1 Productivity premium for state-owned MNCs.
2 Smaller fraction of MNCs among SOEs.
3 Size premium for state-owned MNCs.
Build up model to rationalize these eﬀects:
1 Institutional arbitrage and selection reversal.
Future work:
1 Explore diﬀerence in behavior and motives of ﬁrms (from developing
countries) that go abroad: Brand-building motive?
2 At micro-level, how do these diﬀerences impact ﬁrm-level R&D?
3 At macro-level, how do these diﬀerences aﬀect calculation of
misallocation?
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Appendix
A World with Subsidy
We consider a scenario in which fI goes down by a half while other
parameters are kept unchanged.
Measure of welfare:
Welfare =
1− subtaxper(c , fI )
PH
.
Diﬀerent implications for aggregate productivity and welfare. Go back
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Appendix
Share of MNCs
(Chen, Tian and Yu) Outward FDI and Distortion 37 / 38
Appendix
Welfare and Aggregate Productivity
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